A suspected Chinese intelligence operative established broad connections with both local and national U.S. politicians — including a sitting member of Congress — in what U.S. officials believe was a political intelligence operation orchestrated by China’s main civilian spy agency between 2011 and 2015, according to a yearlong Axios investigation.
Why it matters: The case provides a rare glimpse into Beijing’s efforts to infiltrate and influence American political systems.
Although the individual’s activities reportedly ceased during the Obama administration, U.S. officials remain concerned about China’s influence operations — a threat that persisted through the Trump presidency and continues to be a major focus for counterintelligence under the Biden administration.
Clockwise from top left: Fang pictured with then-Dublin City Councilmember Eric Swalwell at a student event in October 2012; an undated photo of Fang alongside former Fremont Mayor Bill Harrison and Rep. Judy Chu; Fang with then-Rep. Mike Honda and then-San Jose City Councilmember Ash Kalra at a March 2014 gathering at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C.
At the heart of the operation was a Chinese national known as Fang Fang, or Christine Fang, who focused her efforts on rising political figures in the Bay Area and across the United States — individuals viewed as having the potential to ascend to national prominence.
According to current and former U.S. intelligence officials, as well as one former elected official, Fang gained access to political circles through a mix of campaign fundraising, extensive networking, personal charm, and romantic or sexual relationships with at least two Midwestern mayors. These tactics allowed her to move in close proximity to political power.
While officials do not believe Fang obtained or transmitted classified information, the case raised serious concerns. "It was a big deal, because there were some really, really sensitive people that were caught up" in the operation, a senior U.S. intelligence official told Axios. Private but unclassified details — such as officials' routines, preferences, social connections, and even circulating rumors — can be valuable forms of political intelligence, and collecting such information is a core function of foreign intelligence services.
One of the most prominent individuals linked to Fang’s efforts was Rep. Eric Swalwell (D-Calif.). A Bay Area political operative and a current U.S. intelligence official told Axios that Fang was involved in fundraising activities for Swalwell’s 2014 re-election campaign. Swalwell’s office was aware of her involvement at the time, the political operative added. However, there is no evidence that Fang contributed illegally. Federal Election Commission records do not show any donations from her directly, which would be prohibited as she was a foreign national.
Fang also reportedly assisted in placing at least one intern in Swalwell’s office and had multiple interactions with the congressman at various events over several years. In a statement to Axios, Swalwell’s office said: "Rep. Swalwell, long ago, provided information about this person — whom he met more than eight years ago, and whom he hasn’t seen in nearly six years — to the FBI. To protect information that might be classified, he will not participate in your story."
The turning point came in 2015, when federal investigators — alarmed by Fang’s activities — provided Swalwell with what is known as a defensive briefing, a routine measure in counterintelligence operations. Following that briefing, Swalwell cut all ties with Fang. He has not been accused of any wrongdoing.
Fang abruptly left the United States in mid-2015 while the investigation was still underway. Axios made multiple attempts to contact her via email and Facebook but received no response.
Between the lines: The case illustrates China’s long-game strategy of cultivating relationships with promising political figures whose influence may not be realized for years. The Chinese Communist Party recognizes that today’s city council members and mayors can become tomorrow’s state and national leaders.
In the wake of the Fang investigation, the FBI intensified its focus on Chinese influence operations. In May 2019, it created a dedicated unit within the bureau to counter Beijing’s efforts specifically at the state and local levels. National security officials say China’s threat has only intensified since then.
"She was just one of lots of agents," a senior U.S. intelligence official told Axios. FBI Director Christopher Wray echoed that sentiment in a July 2020 speech, saying Beijing is “engaged in a highly sophisticated malign foreign influence campaign” involving “subversive, undeclared, criminal, or coercive attempts to sway our government’s policies, distort our country's public discourse, and undermine confidence in our democratic processes and values.”
The FBI declined to comment on the case. The Chinese Embassy in Washington also did not respond to a request for comment.
Sources: Axios conducted interviews with four current and former U.S. intelligence officials over the course of more than a year. Due to the sensitivity of the matter, they spoke on condition of anonymity. Axios also interviewed 22 individuals — including elected officials, political operatives, and former students — who knew Fang during her time in the United States.
Inside the Operation: How Fang Gained Access and Influence
Fang Fang was believed to be in her late 20s or early 30s while living in the United States, during which time she was enrolled as a student at a university in California’s Bay Area, according to friends and acquaintances.
She attended political gatherings, civic society conferences, campaign events, and campus functions to build connections with elected officials and other influential figures. These efforts were noted by U.S. intelligence officials, Bay Area political operatives, former students, and both current and former elected leaders familiar with her presence.
● U.S. intelligence officials believe Fang managed a network of likely unwitting subagents, some of whom she helped place in local political and congressional offices.
● She attended regional conferences for U.S. mayors, expanding her network among political figures nationwide.
● According to one U.S. intelligence official and one former elected official, Fang engaged in sexual or romantic relationships with at least two Midwestern mayors over a span of about three years.
● At least two of these encounters — including one with a Midwestern mayor — were captured through FBI electronic surveillance, according to two intelligence sources. Axios was unable to identify or contact the officials involved.
Between 2011 and 2015, Fang's activities brought her into contact with numerous prominent political figures in the Bay Area.
She also volunteered for Ro Khanna’s unsuccessful 2014 campaign for the U.S. House of Representatives, according to a former campus organizer and social media posts. (Khanna, a Democrat, later won election to the House in 2016.) His office said he recalled seeing Fang at several Indian American political events but had no further interaction with her. They also confirmed the FBI never briefed him about her activities. Staff from Khanna’s 2014 campaign stated that Fang’s name does not appear in their records, though not all volunteers were officially documented.
Flyer for fundraiser for Rep. Tulsi Gabbard.
● In 2013, Fang was involved in organizing a fundraiser for Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (D-Hawaii), according to an event flyer she shared on Facebook. Over the years, she also appeared in photographs with several California politicians, including Ro Khanna, Rep. Eric Swalwell, Rep. Judy Chu (D-Calif.), and then-Rep. Mike Honda (D-Calif.).
● A spokesperson for Gabbard told Axios that the congresswoman has “no recollection of ever meeting or speaking with [Fang], nor any memory of her playing a significant role in the fundraiser.”
● Fremont City Councilmember Raj Salwan, whose name also appeared on the flyer, said he was unaware of Fang’s involvement and believes her name was added by other Asian American community leaders.
● Rep. Chu’s office reported that they have no record of Christine Fang, while former Rep. Honda stated he does not recall ever meeting her.
From left: Fang with Fremont City Councilmember Raj Salwan (L) and then-U.S. House candidate Ro Khanna at a September 2013 fundraiser for Rep. Tulsi Gabbard; Fang helped organize a 2012 town hall for Rep. Judy Chu.
The takeaway: U.S. officials believe Fang's true purpose in the United States was to collect political intelligence and influence emerging American politicians on matters related to China.
● Close ties between a U.S. elected official and a covert Chinese intelligence operative can offer Beijing a strategic advantage — creating opportunities to shape the perspectives of key policymakers.
● China’s efforts may be aimed at swaying U.S. foreign policy decisions concerning China or influencing more localized issues, such as encouraging partnerships with Chinese firms for economic development — a particularly relevant concern for officials at the municipal level, including mayors and city council members.
Raising Red Flags: How the U.S. Responded
U.S. counterintelligence officials said they believe Fang acted under the direction of China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), the country’s main civilian intelligence agency.
● U.S. officials first became aware of Fang through surveillance targeting another individual — a suspected MSS officer operating under diplomatic cover at the Chinese consulate in San Francisco, according to a current U.S. counterintelligence official.
● The suspected officer allegedly used the consulate as a platform to engage with U.S. state and local politicians, including inviting them on official trips to China.
● Both Fang and the suspected MSS officer were reportedly focused on political intelligence gathering and influence operations in the Bay Area. (Axios confirmed via U.S. State Department records that a Chinese diplomat with the same name as the suspected officer was stationed in San Francisco during Fang’s time there.)
● U.S. officials observed multiple meetings or communications between Fang and the suspected officer, prompting a closer investigation into her own background and activities.
● According to two U.S. officials, Fang’s primary intelligence handlers were believed to be based in China.
Fang was put under FBI surveillance, according to four current and former U.S. officials. The San Francisco Division of the FBI led the counterintelligence investigation into her activities, said one current and one former intelligence official.
● “The fact that she was traveling around the country,” building relationships with U.S. politicians, “was a big red flag,” one official noted. “She was on a mission.”
How It Unfolded: Fang’s Abrupt Departure from the U.S.
U.S. officials say China’s intelligence operation came to a halt in mid-2015 when Fang abruptly left the United States amid an FBI-led investigation.
● Fang had planned to travel to Washington, D.C., to attend a June 2015 event.
● Shortly before the trip, she informed attendees she could no longer participate, citing an unexpected need to return to China, according to a California acquaintance on the same trip who spoke with Axios.
● Many of her political contacts in the Bay Area were surprised and confused by her sudden departure.
● “When she left kind of abruptly, we all kind of scratched our heads,” recalled Bill Harrison, the former mayor of Fremont. (The FBI contacted Harrison after Fang’s departure.)
● “She disappeared off the face of everything,” said Gilbert Wong, former mayor of Cupertino, who frequently saw Fang at political events.
● Around the time of her departure, rumors circulated in Bay Area political circles that the FBI was investigating her, according to four local organizers, operatives, and officials.
● Since leaving, Fang has not returned to the U.S., according to intelligence officials and former political acquaintances. She appears to have cut ties with U.S.-based friends and the networks she spent years building.
● The Justice Department has filed no public charges against Fang.
Why Beijing Sets Its Sights on California’s Bay Area
The Bay Area presents an ideal environment for foreign intelligence operatives looking to identify and influence ambitious local politicians with national potential.
The big picture:
● Some of the most powerful figures in American politics began their careers in Bay Area public service — a fact not lost on Beijing. China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) has even established a dedicated unit focused on political intelligence and influence operations within California.
● Silicon Valley, located in the Bay Area, is the global epicenter of the tech industry, making it a prime target for Chinese economic espionage. Russian intelligence has also maintained a longstanding interest in the region.
● California boasts the largest state economy in the U.S., giving its lawmakers considerable sway over national policy and trends.
● The Bay Area is a Democratic stronghold, from city mayors to congressional representatives. For those seeking political access or influence, this region is essential.
Context:
● The FBI’s history of surveillance targeting left-wing political groups in the 1960s and 1970s has led to lingering distrust of the Bureau in many Bay Area political circles.
● The region is also home to one of the oldest and largest Chinese American communities in the United States. Monitoring diaspora populations remains a top priority for China’s intelligence services, according to U.S. officials.
● Beijing’s spy agencies aim not only to influence these communities to be more sympathetic toward the regime, but also to monitor and suppress any organized opposition to the Chinese Communist Party.
● Access to local government offices provides Chinese operatives a foothold for gathering information on Chinese American communities across the U.S.
A notable case from the 2000s involved China’s MSS allegedly recruiting a San Francisco-based staffer in Senator Dianne Feinstein’s office. The individual, who served as a liaison to the local Chinese community, was dismissed after the FBI warned Feinstein of his suspected activities.
What’s at stake:
● In 2020, Chinese Americans found themselves caught between two pressures: covert influence campaigns from the Chinese government and a surge in anti-Chinese racism in the U.S.
● “We want to fight against racism, we want to call it out,” said Gilbert Wong, the former mayor of Cupertino, in an interview with Axios. “But if there’s a spy, we definitely support full prosecution and we don’t support China penetrating the Chinese community.”
● “How do we address this issue without infringing on Chinese American rights?” he added.
● In a statement, Rep. Ro Khanna expressed support for national security efforts, saying, “I respect the need for law enforcement to protect our nation from espionage.” However, he also emphasized the need for “strict guardrails” to ensure investigations do not violate citizens’ privacy or unfairly target Asian Americans. He warned of “the chilling effect” overbroad surveillance could have on Chinese American political participation.
Fang’s Path to Influence in Bay Area Political Circles
In 2011, Fang enrolled at California State University, East Bay, where she quickly became active in student leadership. She served as president of the university’s Chinese Student Association and also led the campus chapter of Asian Pacific Islander American Public Affairs (APAPA), a national nonprofit that promotes civic engagement among Asian Americans.
● These leadership roles became her entry point into Bay Area political circles. According to former students, local officials, political operatives, and social media evidence, Fang leveraged these positions to host a series of high-profile events, often inviting political leaders, business executives, and Chinese consular officials.
● Her first known interactions with numerous politicians — including Rep. Eric Swalwell, Fremont Mayor Bill Harrison, Rep. Judy Chu, and then-congressional candidate Ro Khanna — took place through her involvement with these student organizations.
● Fang was recognized for her efforts during the 2012–2013 academic year with a campus pride award for her work with the Chinese Student Association.
● During her time at the university, Fang also maintained an unusually close relationship with the Chinese consulate in San Francisco.
It is not uncommon for Chinese Student Association leaders to maintain contact with Chinese consular officials.
● However, Fang’s connection to the San Francisco consulate stood out as especially close, based on event flyers, photographs, social media activity, and the assessment of a current U.S. intelligence official.
Fang was awarded a “Certificate of Honor” by the Chinese consulate in San Francisco in recognition of her leadership as president of the Chinese Student Association at CSU East Bay.
As Fang expanded her involvement beyond campus, she leaned heavily on her affiliation with the Asian Pacific Islander American Public Affairs Association (APAPA).
● “Many of Fang's activities were under the auspices of APAPA,” noted one Bay Area political operative — a sentiment echoed by five other political figures and activists in the region.
● Henry Yin, president of APAPA’s Bay Area chapter, told Axios he had seen Fang at many events and remembered her as “very active.”
● Yin emphasized that APAPA “is not involved with foreign countries” and aims to “make connections with concerned citizens for the betterment of Asian and Pacific Islanders, and also benefit all citizens at large.”
Fang quickly became a familiar face at Bay Area political events, often fundraising for candidates and bringing donors into the fold.
● “She was everywhere,” said Raj Salwan, a current Fremont City Councilmember. “She was an active student. I was surprised at how active she was and how she knew so many politicos.”
● Fang’s Facebook friends list included a wide network of local political figures — city council members, former and current mayors, Rep. Ro Khanna, and even the father and brother of Rep. Eric Swalwell.
● One Bay Area political operative who knew her said Fang deliberately positioned herself “as a connector between the Asian American community and members of Congress.”
● A photograph from a March 2014 event at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., shows Fang with then-Rep. Mike Honda and Ash Kalra, who at the time was a San Jose City Councilmember and was later elected to the California State Assembly in 2016. A representative from Kalra’s office said he does not recall meeting her.
● Fang also attended events in support of former San Francisco Mayor Ed Lee, according to an acquaintance who was present. (Lee began serving in 2011 and passed away in 2017 while in office.)
What people said:
● Several individuals in local political circles described Fang as “charismatic” and “well liked,” while others viewed her as “secretive” or even “suspicious.”
● “Christine was a political player and someone who was good to know,” said a former campus political organizer.
● But others questioned her depth. “She never really, to me, was interested on the policy side,” noted one Bay Area operative.
● Despite her public presence, few people seemed to know her well. Several acquaintances told Axios that she appeared to come from wealth — she drove a white Mercedes, one official recalled — but she rarely spoke about her family or hometown.
Fang’s Ties to Rep. Eric Swalwell
From left: Fang and Rep. Eric Swalwell at a Lunar New Year banquet at CSU East Bay in 2013; together again at a separate event later that year; and at an earlier CSU East Bay gathering in October 2012.
Fang’s relationship with Rep. Eric Swalwell began during his time as a city councilmember in Dublin, California, and exemplifies what U.S. officials describe as China’s long-term approach to cultivating political influence.
● Swalwell’s political rise was swift. He was elected to Congress in late 2012, becoming one of the youngest members of the U.S. House.
● By January 2015, he had secured a seat on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, eventually serving as the lead Democrat on the subcommittee overseeing the CIA.
Details:
● Fang’s earliest known connection to Swalwell came through her role with the Chinese Student Association. By 2014, she had become a recognized figure in local political circles and developed ties to Swalwell’s office.
● According to a Bay Area political operative with direct knowledge, Fang acted as a “bundler” for Swalwell and other candidates — organizing donors and raising funds on their behalf. A current U.S. intelligence official confirmed Fang’s fundraising activity for Swalwell, and a local elected official noted she also brought in donors for other campaigns.
Bundlers are key political allies, often delivering large sums of money by encouraging others to contribute. Their role deepens a campaign’s outreach to specific communities and can translate into substantial influence.
● The Bay Area operative who witnessed Fang’s fundraising said they had concerns about the legal status of some donors she brought in. However, they found no evidence of unlawful contributions.
● Fang also helped facilitate intern placements in Swalwell’s office. According to the same operative, at least one intern she recommended was assigned to Swalwell’s Washington, D.C., office. This detail was confirmed by a current U.S. intelligence official.
● Targeting Swalwell made strategic sense for Fang. His 2012 congressional campaign was a longshot — a young city councilmember challenging a well-established Democratic incumbent — and it relied heavily on Asian American voter support, according to a former congressional staffer from the East Bay.
● As a result, Swalwell’s connection to the Chinese American community, including organizations like APAPA (Asian Pacific Islander American Public Affairs), played a crucial role in his early political success — making him an attractive figure for influence efforts.
Fang Targeted Mayors Across the United States
Fang attended multiple conferences for U.S. mayors, according to three U.S. intelligence officials and several current and former elected officials who were familiar with her.
Why it matters:
● By participating in gatherings of local officials, Fang went to notable lengths to connect with and befriend U.S. politicians — efforts that U.S. officials believe were part of her work as an intelligence operative for China.
Details:
● According to one U.S. intelligence official and one former elected official, Fang engaged in sexual or romantic relationships with at least two Midwestern mayors.
● At a 2014 mayoral conference in Washington, D.C., an older Midwestern mayor from what was described as “an obscure city” referred to Fang as his “girlfriend,” despite a significant age gap between them. Former Cupertino Mayor Gilbert Wong, who was present, said the mayor insisted the relationship was genuine.
● In a separate incident, a current U.S. official said Fang had a sexual encounter with an Ohio mayor inside a car under FBI electronic surveillance. When the mayor asked why she was interested in him, Fang reportedly responded that she wanted to improve her English.
What they’re saying:
● Gilbert Wong told Axios he originally met Fang through her political involvement in California, where she frequently attended fundraisers and Chinese cultural events.
● Wong said he was “shocked” to see her again at an event for U.S. municipal leaders hosted by the Chinese Embassy in Washington, D.C., in March 2014. He noted that he had traveled to D.C. twice that year for mayor-related events and encountered Fang at both.
● At the Chinese Embassy gathering, Fang introduced Wong to the mayor of Shenzhen — a major technology hub and sister city to Cupertino — and translated for the two mayors so they could converse.
Key Takeaway
U.S. intelligence officials believe China’s spy services have grown increasingly bold in their influence efforts and political intelligence operations targeting the United States. Fang’s case highlights how a single, persistent individual — allegedly acting on behalf of Beijing — can infiltrate and build connections within sensitive American political networks.